Season summary: The Rockets lost not the Warriors, but the philosophy?

In the first round of the 2025 NBA playoffs, the Rockets and Warriors' showdown was the most bloody round of the series. The two teams fought to the seventh game, and every goal and every round were related to life and death. In the end, the Rockets fell to the last step and finally lost the life and death battle, ending their playoff journey this season.

Looking at the entire series, the Rockets showed young potential, basic suffocating defense, and even a mature mentality that was inconsistent with age. From a certain perspective, this loss was not inferior to others or the lineup was not enough. The Rockets were fully qualified to win this round of the series, but unfortunately, in essence, the Rockets lost to a trend: the concept of magic ball.

What is a magic ball?

The core belief of the Magic Ball is not difficult to understand. In the same offense, the score of the three-pointer is often higher than the middle distance or the inside shot. To compare, even if the three-point shooting percentage is only 35%, which is converted into the score of each shot (0.35×3=1.05 points), it is still higher than the two-point shooting percentage of 50% (0.5×2=1.0 points).

Under such scoring logic, modern basketball is constantly driving towards a large number of three-point shots, opening up offensive space, and fast-paced style of play.

The Warriors are undoubtedly the best spokesperson for the Magic Ball concept. Even though Curry's three-pointer ability has declined in recent years, his deputy has been replaced by Butler, who is not good at three-pointers. However, as long as the Warriors coach Kerr is still on the team, his system still determines that the Warriors will always be a Magic Ball projection team with a modern style.

Whether it is Hilde or Podgemsky, they all have the ability to shoot three-pointers. Even if they do not have the scoring craze of the Splash Brothers in their heyday, they can still make a huge offensive advantage with a wave of three-pointers in a short period of time when they feel online.

Rockets' tactical execution

For the Rockets, referring to their first round performance, Uduka was prepared early. He was very clear about the Rockets' advantages and clearly realized that he could not score a three-pointer against the Warriors, but should rely on his size and height and strong inside advantage to break the situation.

In this round of series, the Rockets showed quite mature tactical deployment. They no longer blindly performed outside shooting, but emphasized low-level singles, down-receiver, etc., using the height and penalty area skills of inside players Shin Kyung, Smith Jr., Adams and other big men to score points.

From the facts, this choice is indeed correct. In the entire series, the Rockets scored 140 free throws far higher than the Warriors' 94, and the total rebounds of 328 also surpassed the Warriors' 277. In some rounds, the Rockets relied on their stable inside offense and strengthened hard defense from outside, and finally reached a climax, dragging the series into tiebreak. Although I missed the promotion, it was not a mistake in tactical choice at least.

But the problem is that whenever the Rockets work hard to score continuously and defend the Warriors several attacks, the Warriors can always quickly stabilize the situation with one or two three-pointers. This is the terrible thing about the Magic Ball. It can erase the advantages you have gained for a long time in a flash. The microcosm of the tiebreak battle: Three-point decisions to win and lose

The last minute of the first quarter of the seventh game is the best reflection of the magic ball concept in this round of the series. The Rockets made continuous success by relying on strong inside shots, and once reversed the score, and even gradually showed signs of a rise. However, after just two rounds, the Warriors relied on Hilde to hit difficult three-pointers one after another, not only reversed the score, but also extinguished the Rockets' turnaround momentum.

In the face of the Warriors' three-point craze, the Rockets' response was to steadily play low because this is their strength. But such a slow pace cannot offset the firepower that the opponent burst out instantly. When the score fell into a tug-of-war again and the Warriors broke the situation with a three-pointer, the Rockets could only catch up with two points. Entering the last moment, this gap in efficiency was gradually magnified infinitely, and ultimately determined the victory or defeat of the series.

Once again, the data reveals the logic of this phenomenon:

In the entire seven-game series, the Warriors made 108 of 302 three-pointers, with a shooting percentage of 35.8%; the Rockets made 74 of 198 shots, with a shooting percentage of 37.4%. On the surface, the Rockets’ three-point shooting percentage was even slightly higher than the Warriors.

But the focus is not on hit rate, but on the number of shots and hits. The Warriors made 104 more three-pointers than the Rockets and eventually hit 24 more goals, which directly equals the gap of 24 more points. In terms of conversion, if the Rockets want to make up for 24 points in the two-point field, they need to hit 12 more two-pointers to get the draw back.

This is also the best portrayal of the two teams' battle to the tiebreak. The situation of the two teams is really difficult to distinguish. The Rockets rely on their high shooting percentage and stable execution to erode their opponents; the Warriors rely on their large number of three-point shots and explosive scoring power to quickly build their advantages. The Rockets' style of play is stable and solid, but the scoring pace is slow; the Warriors' shooting percentage is slightly lower, but relying on their large volume and strong volatility, they can always open up the gap at critical moments.

This also once again confirms the truth of the Magic Ball concept. In today's NBA, under the premise of a large number of three-pointers, even if the shooting percentage is not top, it can rely on quantitative changes to trigger qualitative changes, which ultimately determines the direction of the game.

The gap in physical energy consumption

, and another factor that cannot be ignored comes from physical energy consumption.

The offense and defense intensity in the playoffs will be improved, especially the referee's standard in the playoffs is relatively loose, and every wave of inside offense must consume a huge amount of energy.

When Shin Kyung fought alone in the interior, we can clearly observe that compared with the first six games, Green in the seventh game pushed Shin Kyung out one meter away from the basket many times. The meaning of this picture is very simple. Frequent inside attacks have led to a significant decline in Shen Jing's physical strength, which in turn has led to a significant decrease in offensive efficiency..

In the final stage of the tie-break battle, when the Warriors made three-pointers in a row and gradually occupied the momentum, the Rockets made several pass mistakes and simple layup ending mistakes. These seemingly slight mistakes are the most fatal in the high-intensity tie-break battle, and are also the direct reflection of the Rockets' physical energy consumption. Coupled with the continuous accumulation of high-intensity pressure, the final collapse of the tie-break battle. Should the Rockets strive for Durant?

After this round of playoffs, the Rockets have proved their basic strength and they have a set of young core teams worth looking forward to. Shin Kyung's low-post footsteps and support ability, Smith Jr.'s internal and external potential, and Jaylen Green's breakthrough score explosion at some stages, these young players have shown top potential, and also allowed Houston fans to see the opportunity to return to glory in the future.

However, if this core set wants to truly break through the first round of the playoffs or even move to the championship stage, it will eventually face a major test of the magic ball system. This round of the series with the Warriors has already given a dangerous signal, and the Warriors are not the top team in the league's three-point offense today. Their external firepower is only based on the upper and middle level of the Magic Ball concept.

In other words, if the Rockets really want to hold the championship trophy in the future, they will inevitably face this difficulty. How to avoid being defeated by the opponent's outside explosion in the face of these three-point shooting teams is a problem they need to focus on in the offseason.

This is exactly why the Rockets must strive for Durant this summer. Although this historical-level scorer has entered the second half of his career, with not much declining defensive skills, the offensive end still has the most difficult projection threat to affect today's NBA. His mid-range singles and offensive skills outside the tactical system are the critical moment terminator role that this young Rockets lineup urgently needs.

And more importantly, Durant's arrival has the opportunity to completely rewrite the Rockets' offense. When the opponent's defense is restrained by Shin Kyung and Smith Jr. in the interior, Durant can make jump shots that he is good at in the outside or in the elbow area, bringing greater space advantages to the Rockets and completely liberate Shin Kyung's interior potential.

Season Summary: Losing to Magic Ball is promising in the future

, the Rockets still show future potential, and they also understand their current advantages and disadvantages.

From a certain perspective, they did not lose to the Warriors, but to the Magic Ball concept that has been nurtured by modern basketball evolution. Facing this reality does not mean that the Rockets need to give up their inside advantage; on the contrary, while maintaining their own characteristics, they can seek opportunities to gradually make up for their shortcomings, and eventually evolve into a more comprehensive strong team, and then wait for the moment when the Houston Red Age truly arrives.